Abstract. Over recent years, a whole new process known as data mining, equivalent to automated techniques processing large sets of data in order to extract patterns, relationships, trends and other information not traceable through usual 'human' reading, has been largely gaining in repute.
that case, the groups are predefined and the search is targeted at finding patterns explaining the differences among them.
Data mining, believed to be free from human bias inherent in the study of small amounts of data, is based on the collection -or enrollment-of various types of information that has been greatly facilitated by substantial technological advancements, like the significant expansion of computer storage capacities. Some of data mining applications appear quite promising and have, therefore, become increasingly popular, in a variety of fields, including business transactions (e-commerce and e-banking, CRM-Customer Relationship Management, insurance, retail), research activities (astronomy, clinical medicine, genetic data analyzing) and state security (financial fraud or credit card fraud detection, based on the consumer's purchasing behavior pattern 5 , border control or detection of criminal and terrorist activities).
However, as a result of technological boundaries, the data mining techniques aren't completely reliable. 6 Errors might occur due to the incorrect integration of data into a data set, or due to the integration of missing data, wrong data or non-standard representation of the same data (named dirty data). In addition to that, the design and functionality -i.e. the technology's purpose, which is always adapted to a specific context of use 7 -of the data mining algorithms themselves 8 will usually "reflect the
values of [their] designer[s] (…) if only to the extent that a particular design is preferred
(by the designer)as the best or most efficient option". 5 See, for instance, an application of data mining techniques by the Gemalto Assurance Hub, to detect frauds in the context of online banking services, 'La biométrie et le « machine learning »: la combinaison gagnante de Gemalto pour plus de confiance dans les services bancaires en ligne '(2017) <https://www.gemalto.com/press/Pages/Biometrie-et-machine-learning-La-combinaison-gagnante-deGemalto-pour-plus-de-confiance-dans-les-services-bancaires.aspx> accessed 13 November 2017. 6 Pointedly, "At Frankfurt Airport, a system with an FRR of 1 % would produce more than 1,000 false alarms per day", See Hornung G., 'The European Biometric Passports: Legislative Procedures, Political Interactions, Legal Framework and Technical Safeguards' [2007] 4 SCRIPT ED 257. 7 "It thus cannot be assumed that an observer's interpretation will correctly reflect the perception of the actor rather than the biases of the interpreter", Mittelstadt B.D., Allo P., Taddeo M., Wachter S. and Floridi L.,'The ethics of algorithms: Mapping the debate' [2016] Big Data & Society, 1,<https://www.academia.edu/29344788/The_Ethics_of_Algorithms_Mapping_the_Debate>, accessed 13 November 2017. 8 "The most commonly used techniques in data mining are: Artificial neural networks, Decision trees, Genetic algorithms, Nearest neighbor method, Rule induction etc.", Thearling K., supra note 2. 9 "Development is not a neutral, linear path; there is no objectively correct choice at any given stage of development, but many possible choices (Johnson, 2006) ", Mittelstadt B.D., supra note 7.
In this context, the purpose driving data collection and use (e.g. medical data banks can be used for public health purposes or scientific research), as well as the identity of the collector, play a major role.
B. Data Μining applications in biometric data
Inevitably, the development of these cutting-edge technological advancements paved the way of the application of data mining methodology in biometric data.
Biometrics are defined as "the measurement and analysis of unique physical(fingerprints or hand geometry, facial thermogram, iris, retinal pattern etc.) or behavioral characteristics(like human voice, keystroke dynamics 11 helpful in finding out passwords' or personal identification numbers' frauds etc.), especially as a means of verifying personal identity".
12
Biometric data are unique to each person and of a permanent character as they cannot be modified nor be susceptible to alteration. In addition to that, they are collectable and quantitatively measurable, as they can be easily scanned and quantified by sensors. 13 Due to the said specific features, they are considered to be more reliable in verifying a person's identity.
In practice, biometric sensors scan individuals' characteristics to create a digital representation which will be further processed by a feature extractor in order to generate a template (i.e. a compact but expressive representation). The templates are then stored in a central database or recorded on movable devices, like magnetic cards, biometric passports, visas or smartcards. They can be analyzed alone or in combination with other types of data-through multimodal biometric systems-in order to treat together different properties of the same identifier or different perceptions of the same identifier as perceived by different sensors.
14 Data mining technology, especially when applied to biometric data, can produce outstanding scientific results. 15 However, biometrics seem to be mostly used for verification purposes as a match comparison, named authentication (one-to-one search)
or as an associative identification system (one-to-many search), 16 where constructed templates are instantly and electronically checked through central databases, so as to verify a claimed identity and to describe, if required, a pre-registered person. 17 Thus, the consideration of biometrics as more reliable than conventional strategies for identity verifications led to their preferential use for commercial and -mainly-public security purposes.
On the other hand, strong privacy concerns were raised by scholars for inappropriate use of biometric information. These concerns were mostly attributed to the nature of the collection and retention process, since biometric measurements are mainly collected in remote authentication settings, notwithstanding the fact that data mining in biometrics is also used for authentication purposes in other areas, not always correlating with public security issues. In the era of proliferation of terrorist attacks, it is fingerprints and other biometric information that governmental authorities are after. Another issue of substantial concern emanates from the automated character of these practices that excludes ipso facto the fulfillment of the prior consent principle, basic prerequisite in data protection law. In particular, the data subject is not able to
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Sermondadaz S., 'Avec les Big Data et la biométrie, Big Brother s'invite au bureau, Sciences et Avenir', [2017] , https://www.sciencesetavenir.fr/high-tech/data/avec-les-big-data-et-la-biometrie-big-brother-sinvite-au-bureau_110644 accessed 14 November 2017. 21 See in relation to data anonymization policies Gal T.Z., Kovacs G., Kardovacks Z., 'Survey on privacy preserving data mining techniques in health care databases ' [2014] 6 Acta Univ. Sapientiae, Informatica, 1, 33.
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Scientists tend to argue against anonymization: "the more you try to hide sensitive private information, the less valuable it is for analysis (…). If personal or sensitive data (…) can only be accessed, transferred or handled by entities explicitly stated in regulations, and with the consent of the data subject, researchers working with such databases will stumble very early in the legal limitations",Ibidem. 23 and, progressively, to cases with regard to data stored in computers, to videosurveillance in Peck 31 or storage of such data to secret registers (as it was the case in However, apart from the guarantees provided by the EU soft law with regard to the right to data protection, its explicit recognition as a fundamental right of equivalent value within the EU legal framework came with the adoption of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the Rights of the European Union (EU Charter or EUCFR).
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The EU Charter, which came into force on the 1 st December 2009, not only contained a provision pertaining to the respect for private and family life, but established explicitly the right to data protection as enshrined in Art.8 EUCFR.
42 Drafted a few years after the adoption of the Data Protection Directive, Art. 8 of the Charter must be deemed as reflecting pre-existing EU data protection law and relevant jurisprudential principles. In this regard, the Charter, not only ensures the right to data protection but establishes also key data protection principles related to the consent of the data subject, the establishment of independent authorities supervising the implementation of the said principles and the access to documents. 42 Article 8 of the EU Charter reads as follows: "1.Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority." 43 Handbook on European data protection law , European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe (2014) protection through a rather strict interpretation of the data protection law, this milestone ruling of the Court was seen by some scholars as conferring to the data subjects the right to be forgotten and to control, therefore, their online reputation. Particularly, in
Google Spain, M. Gonzalez who asked for the deletion of the published information in the online version of La Vanguardia newspaper regarding his personal data related to his participation to a real-estate auction held in 1998, alleged inter alia that when an internet user searched for his full name in the Google search engine, he would obtain access to two links to the newspaper's website on which the announcements with his personal data appeared. As the publisher of La Vanguardia and Google Spain, which in the meantime forwarded M. Gonzalez's request to Google Inc., denied to remove or rectify the relevant information, the plaintiff, addressed subsequently his complaint to the Spanish DPA. The latter rejected the request as far as the newspaper was concerned, ordering, however, Google Spain to delist the aforementioned information from its search results. fundamental rights. Hence, as Kuner correctly deduced "the judgment provides a strong affirmation of online data protection rights, but fails to indicate a way forward for their effective implementation and realization, the development of which will likely be a struggle for data controllers, DPAs, and courts".
55
As previously discussed, striking the correct balance in the data protection legal field is not a new territory for the EU judges but now, it is under the umbrella of the EU Charter that this exercise will be constantly carried out and this time, not only between fundamental rights and EU internal market freedoms, but also between conflicting fundamental rights both embodied in the Charter. providers to retain specific types of data relating to communications of individuals for security purposes. These retained data were telecommunications, traffic data in regard to e-mails, internet access and internet telephony, location data and data needed to identify a subscriber or a registered user. Despite the lack of a legal basis for retaining the content of these telecommunications, the whole background of the Directive appeared problematic.
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The Court focused, first and foremost, on the validity of the Directive at stake in light of the rights to privacy, data protection and freedom of expression as embodied in the EU Charter. After having declared the relevance of Art.7 and 8 with regard to the validity of the Directive, the CJEU stated that "those data, taken as a whole, may allow very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data has been retained, such as the habits of everyday life, permanent or temporary places of residence, daily or other movements, the activities carried out, the social relationships of those persons and the social environments frequented by them." Therefore, the Court ruled that the obligations deriving from the Directive to retain data as well as the access to that data by the MS's authorities constituted an interference with the right to privacy and, since the Directive was also providing for processing of personal data, it violated the right to the protection of personal data.
In relation to the justification of the infringement, the CJEU examined the proportionality of the violation pursuant to Article 52(1) EUCFR and stressed that the essence of the rights at stake was respected. Subsequently, it attempted to ascertain whether the Data Retention Directive fulfilled an objective of general interest and did not go beyond what was suitable to achieve its purpose, concluding that, under the circumstances of the present case, the Directive fulfilled this purpose.
With regard to the examination of the final element of necessity of the proportionality test, the CJEU reiterated that derogations from fundamental rights should be accepted only when strictly necessary and held that the Directive did not
provide clear and precise rules regarding the extent of the interference. 61 The EU legislature did not require a clear and strong connection between the data retained and serious crime or public security. 62 Additionally, the Directive failed to designate particular substantive and procedural conditions delimitating the access and use of the data retained by competent national authorities. 63 Regarding data security, the Directive lacked clear safeguards for the protection of the retained data. Moreover, the Directive abstained from clarifying that the data must be retained within the European Union and, therefore, within the scope of control of national Data Protection Authorities. On these grounds, the Directive was declared ab initio invalid by the Court.
The Court, for the first time, blatantly used the EU Charter as a vehicle to strike down an entire EU Directive and to put severe pressure on EU institutions in order to modify the legal context of the retention of data, confirming the tremendous significance of the protection of privacy and data protection within the EU. During the last decades, the European judicial fora were repeatedly confronted with cases in which human rights were clashing with public interest objectives. As for the reasoning which the Court did provide, the surprising aspect of the CJEU's appraisal is that the Court clearly makes a distinction between the two: respecting the very essence of a right is not sufficient because even if the latter is respected, the legislation at stake can still be disproportionate.
Another significant element of the Digital Rights Ireland ruling is, as Steve
Peers correctly stressed, "the development of a doctrine indicating when strict scrutiny of the EU legislature's interference with fundamental rights should apply." 65 That definitely relies on the ECtHR's relevant jurisprudence, cited many times by the Court in the course of its reasoning. 66 Nevertheless, the application of the EU Charter by the CJEU gave the opportunity to the latter to raise even more the standards posed by its Strasbourg peer which, clearly served as "springboard" for the development of the CJEU's case law in this field as it expanded significantly the application of Art.8 ECHR.
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All that said, this ruling definitely laid the ground for a stricter scrutiny exercised by the Luxembourg Court particularly in cases in which digital rights are at stake. In this respect, despite the definite impact of the ECtHR, the Charter appears to be the true game-changer, a development also reaffirmed by another milestone data protection case, the Facebook case or the Schrems case, 68 53 sufficient level of data protection in the US equivalent to the one designated by the EU data protection law requirements.
Therefore, the CJEU underlined that provisions of the Data Protection Directive must be applied in conformity with the fundamental human rights as ensured by the EU Charter and, most importantly, with the rights to a private and family life, the protection of personal data, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. In this regard, despite the fact that the Commission's decisions "are in principle presumed to be lawful and accordingly produce legal effects until such time as they are withdrawn, annulled in an action for annulment or declared invalid following a reference for a preliminary ruling When shedding light to the basic aspects of the case, it is more than evident that, following the Court's findings in Google Spain and Digital Rights Ireland, the Court now declares that even when a separate regime regulating external transfers is under scrutiny, an almost identical level of protection is required so as to guarantee compatibility with the EU Charter's provision related to data protection. However, as The CJEU's standing not only reveals its belief that, in the post-Lisbon era, an even higher level of data protection is required under the Charter, but reflects its position in favour of an extended protection regarding data transfers to third countries, introducing, thus, an extraterritorial effect of the Charter's provisions in relation to digital rights.
The Court takes the right to privacy so seriously that reaches the conclusion that extended access to personal data by public authorities and law enforcement authorities, even in the name of national security, affects the "essence" of the right to private life under Art. 7 EU Charter. In this respect, no proportionality test or balancing exercise involving other rights and freedoms is required as far as the core of this right is breached.
74
In conclusion, despite the criticism initially raised against the Court of Justice for not taking fundamental rights seriously enough and its reluctance in producing bold judgments in this field, post Lisbon, its case law on the Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter reveals its tendency to be a frontrunner in data protection law, particularly in "the digital age". However, this task is certainly not a walk in the park. In fact, the CJEU's position on the matter needs to be further clarified, especially in view of the Court's active interaction with its Strasbourg peer in this field.
C. Willems case: a U-turn of the CJEU with regard to biometric data?
While the evolution of the CJEU jurisprudence on the matter was already The said questions raised, firstly, the issue whether the Passport Regulation is applicable to certain types of identity cards regardless their period of validity. The latter plays a central role for the Dutch identity cards' consideration as travel documents according to the spirit of the aforesaid Regulation. Secondly, pursuant to the applicants' allegations, the CJEU was called to pronounce on whether the re-use for other purposes of biometric data originally collected for the issuance of passports is compatible with the EU data protection legislation and with Art.7 and 8 of the EU Charter.
At the outset, the Luxembourg Court focused persistently its reasoning on the wording of the Regulation which provides that provided that "identity cards issued to [Member States'] nationals or to temporary passports and travel documents having a validity of 12 months or less". The Court interpreted this particular provision as having no application on national identity cards and, thus, Dutch identity cards fall outside the scope of the Regulation, neglecting not only the fact that they also serve as travel documents within the EU, but also their period of validity which lasts for five years.
As for the second question, the Court concluded that it cannot rule on the further use of biometric data of passports since the latter fall outside the purposes of this Regulation and, therefore, subject to regulation by national law. For that reason, the Court shockingly came to the conclusion that since the potential re-use of such data by national authorities is not governed by the said Passport Regulation, the EU Charter is not applicable either, despite the fact that such a process might be in violation of the ECHR.
Finally, the Court refrained to pronounce on the compatibility of national law with Art.6 and 7 of the Data Protection Directive 78 on the grounds that only the correct interpretation of the Passport Regulation was at stake in the present case.
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Article 6 of the Data Protection Directive provides that: "1. Member States shall provide that personal data must be: (a) processed fairly and lawfully;(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. Further processing of data for historical, statistical or scientific purposes shall not be considered as incompatible provided that Member States provide appropriate safeguards;(c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed; (d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the purposes for which they were collected or for which they are further processed, are erased or rectified;(e) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are further processed. Member States shall lay down appropriate safeguards for personal data stored for longer periods for historical, statistical or scientific use.2. It shall be for the controller to ensure that paragraph 1 is complied with.Article 7 reads as follows : "Member States shall provide that personal data may be processed only if:(a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; or (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; or (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject; or(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed; or(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection under Article 1 (1)". Consequently, the Willems ruling constitutes a step back from the previously discussed jurisprudential progress in the field of data protection. Notably, the Court, in contradiction with its modus operandi in previous similar cases, insisted on the wording of the referred questions in order to restrict its own competence. 79 Looking at the previous CJEU's case law, the Court paradoxically misses the chance to elaborate on the intriguing questions of the national Court, particularly in the light of the Charter's standards. Besides its prior data protection case law, it's only in its Schwarz ruling in 2013 80 when the CJEU examined the storage of fingerprints under the Passport Regulation in the light of Art.7 and 8 of the Charter and concluded that such a use of biometric data does not constitute a disproportionate interference with the right to private life and the right to data protection respectively, as enshrined in the EU Charter.
In any case, the mere fact that the applicants invoked the Passport Regulation brought the matter under the scope of EU law and, thereby, of the Charter since the use of biometric data in the new generation of passports relies on an EU obligation. 81 In addition to this, the unwillingness of the Court to redraft the question on the compatibility with the Data Protection Directive in order to avoid addressing the issue already raised by the national Court "simply departs from reality".
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IIΙ. Conclusions
Under the pressure of proliferation of data mining techniques, developing increasingly intrusive implications in individuals' private life, the legal protection of personal data calls for a systematic and articulate legal regulation.
The concept of privacy as captured under Article 8 of the ECHR, in correlation with the right to data protection as enshrined in the EU Charter (Article 8), point towards an enhanced protection, that could equip the EU Courts with valuable tools in order to review more effectively EU data protection legislation.
Notwithstanding the strict scrutiny with regard to the use of personal data exercised by the Luxembourg Court and its effort to walk hand-in-hand with its Strasbourg counterpart on the matter, the Court seemed in Willems case to consider the fate of biometric data collected as completely irrelevant to the EU legal framework.
Regardless of what the impact of this judgment might be in the foreseeable future, it raises great concerns pertaining to the actual enjoyment of the right to private life or the protection of the most sensitive personal data, namely the biometric ones.
Most importantly, in the era of mass surveillance and "big data", both the European judicial mechanisms are now engaged in building a more solid legal shelter for the collection, storage and processing of such data. 83 Hence, leaving the further use of biometric data of EU citizens unattended might open progressively the Pandora's box for uncontrolled misuse or abuse of data containing biological information of individuals. The new General Data Protection Regulation does not seem to respond sufficiently to this ever-growing anxiety and in this respect, it is largely criticized by numerous scholars even before its entry into force. 84 Thus, automated profiling or data mining practices, which when intensively applied, might offer a great deal of benefits in the field of scientific research, might also constitute a threat to private life if the EU or international institutions continue to avoid verging into this whole new territory. The viability and efficiency, therefore, of a comprehensive regulatory regime addressing these newly emerging challenges will largely depend on its appraisal by involved legislative and judicial bodies. 
